

Cuba

25X1

NNNNVV KDA932KAC956

ZNY MMORR

ZKZK PP NDA DE

P 132246Z MAY 76 ZNZ-1

FM SSD DIA

TO DINDZ

YEKLOKC/COMPHIBGRU TWO

YWOZLVC/USAFSACS

6948SCTYS(M)/ERAFSSD (DEPLOYED)

ZEM

TOP SECRET UMBRA NOFORN/UNINTEL

DIN-1B 05061 MAY 76

DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 134-3B (AS OF: 1521 EDT-13 MAY 76)

USSR: SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA. (C)

1. (TS UMBRA/NOFORN/UNINTEL) THE QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENTS SUPPLIED TO CUBA IN 1975 SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE COMMITTED ONLY TO A MINIMUM REPLACEMENT PROGRAM, DESPITE REPEATED REQUESTS FOR MORE ADVANCED MATERIEL. NO NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED. EIGHT SOVIET SHIPS TRANSPORTED 14,000 TONS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, SOMEWHAT MORE THAN THE 10,000 TO 12,500 TONS THAT HAVE BEEN DELIVERED ANNUALLY SINCE 1968. THE INCREASE PROBABLY REFLECTS MOSCOW'S EFFORTS TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT THAT HAVANA HAD USED IN ANGOLA.

2. (TS UMBRA/NOFORN/UNINTEL) THESE DELIVERIES INCLUDED A WIDE VARIETY OF MATERIEL, INCLUDING 16 MIG-21/FISHBED LS, A MORE MODERN VERSION OF THAT MODEL ALREADY IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY, AND BY COMPONENTS OF THE SA-3/GOA MISSILE SYSTEM. EVIDENTLY, FIDEL CASTRO'S RECENT REQUESTS FOR THE MORE SOPHISTICATED MIG-23/FLOGGER AND AN IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM WERE REJECTED. OTHER IDENTIFIED DELIVERIES IN 1975 INCLUDED OXIDIZER TANKS, COMMUNICATION VANS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SA-2/GUIDELINE MISSILE SYSTEM, AND A SMALL NUMBER OF NAVAL CRAFT.

3. (S/NOFORN/UNINTEL) SHIPMENTS IN 1976 ARE EXPECTED TO AT LEAST EQUAL THOSE OF 1975, ALLOWING THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN INVENTORIES AT THE SAME LEVEL THAT HAS PREVAILED FOR THE PAST SEVEN YEARS. SHOULD CUBA, HOWEVER, BECOME MORE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT OF THE RHODESIAN LIBERATION EFFORT, A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE COULD OCCUR.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

(XGDS-2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ORIGINATOR)

#6759

SSD
JAH
CS
EPD
ET

MAN 13 7 55 PM '76

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SRE/OK, JS~~

~~SRI~~

25X1